Abstract We prove that defining consumers' preferences over budget sets is both necessary and sufficient to make every fully informative and finite set of observed consumption choices rationalizable by a collection of preferences which are transitive, complete, and monotone with respect to own consumption. Our finding has two important theoretical consequences. First, assuming that preferences depend on budget sets is illegitimate under the scientific commitments of revealed preference theory. Second, as long as consumers' preferences are not defined over budget sets, we can assume that preferences depend on observable objects other than own consumption without compromising the logical possibility to reject the model against observation. We however point out that, despite this logical possibility, in practice it can be almost impossible to reject a model where preferences are defined over objects that depend on budget sets. As an example of this we show that if preferences are defined over consumption choices of other individuals then rationalization fails only in cases of negligible practical interest.
Introduction
The economic literature has repeatedly suggested that consumers' preferences can possibly depend on prices. 1 However, so far no systematic analysis has been conducted on the legitimacy of assuming price-dependent preferences under the scientific commitments of revealed preference theory. In other words, it is not yet fully clear if assuming that preferences depend on prices is compatible with the desideratum that observed consumption behaviors are not necessarily consistent with the hypothesis of rational choice.
In the present paper, we investigate this issue by studying the rationalizability of consumers choices under the assumption that preferences depend on budget sets-the latter being the natural generalization of the assumption of price-dependent preferences to the case of non-linear budget sets (see e.g., Forges et Minelli 2009). As in Afriat (1967) we suppose to observe a fully informative but finite set of consumer choices and we derive under what conditions observations are consistent with rational choice. Differently from Afriat's model, we do not constraint preferences to depend on consumption only, but we allow for the possibility that preferences depend on any observable object. The relevance of this generalization-which goes well beyond the consideration of price-dependent preferences-is discussed below.
Our main finding is that assuming preferences to depend on budget sets is a necessary and sufficient condition for making every fully informative and finite set of observed consumption choices rationalizable by a collection of preferences which are transitive, complete, and monotone with respect to own consumption. This result has two important consequences. First, under the assumption that preferences depend on budget sets the hypothesis of rational choice cannot be logically refuted by observed behavior. Therefore, assuming that individuals' preferences are price-dependent is methodologically illegitimate under the scientific commitments of revealed preference theory. Second, assuming that individuals do not care about budget sets is sufficient to obtain that observed behavior can possibly refute the hypothesis of rational choice. Since this result holds in a general framework where preferences can depend on any observable object, we can conclude that letting preferences depend on observable objects other than own consumption is legitimate provided that we maintain priceindependence.
Of course, the logical possibility of refuting the hypothesis of rational choice does not imply the practical possibility to do so. Therefore, great caution has to be had in assuming that preferences depend on objects other than own consumption. We substantiate this warning with an example where we show that if preferences are assumed to depend on the choices made by other individuals, then the hypothesis of rational choice can be refuted only in cases of negligible practical interest. In other words, our example shows that allowing preferences to depend on objects which, in turn, depend
